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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF
FEMALE INMATES: THE NEED FOR REDRESS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 19831
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."2
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment addresses the inadequate statutory and
constitutional remedies for female inmates who have been
subjected to abuse by male prison guards.' Historically,
women have been subjected to "sexual abuse and oppression"
by the males who controlled the prisons for women.4 In the
United States, the women's prison reformers were particu-
larly concerned "with the sexual abuse of incarcerated women
by male officials in institutions housing both sexes."' Today,
while there is still a problem with female inmates being
sexually abused by male guards; current research rarely dis-
cusses the extent of this problem.6
According to one theorist, since women only comprise
approximately 7.5% of all incarcerated persons, the special
problems affecting women are often overlooked.7 In the
1970s, research documented the high risk of women in U.S.
jails being sexually assaulted by male officials.' This study
acknowledged reports of outright rape, as well as the re-
quirement of sexual "favors" in exchange for women's basic
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
3. See discussion infra Part III.
4. ALIDA V. MERLO & JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, WOMEN, LAW, & SOCIAL
CONTROL (1995).
5. JOANNE BELKNAP, THE INVISIBLE WOMAN: GENDER, CRIME, AND
JUSTICE 93 (1996). This was also the same with regards to the reformers' con-
cerns in England. Id.
6. Id. at 100.
7. Id. at 101; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE JUNE 7, 1991 FORUM ON ISSUES
IN "FEMALE OFFENDERS" (1991). In the early 1980s, women were 5% of the of-
fenders in prisons; in June of 1991 that number had increased to 7.5%. Id.
BELKNAP, supra note 5, at 100. The number of women in U.S. prisons tripled
during the 1980s, while the number of men only doubled. Id. at 100-01. In the
1990s women constituted approximately 6% of incarcerated persons. Id. at 101.
8. Id. at 100.
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needs.9 For example, in 1974, the North Carolina prison sys-
tem could no longer overlook the sexual assault of female in-
mates by guards after one female inmate fought off an at-
tempted oral rape by her male guard." Since then, female
inmates have filed suit against male prison officials for such
violations and allegations of sexual misconduct.1 As recently
as 1996, three female inmates brought suit against federal
prison authorities, alleging that some of the male guards
were "selling" female inmates to male inmates who, in turn,
proceeded to sexually assault and beat them."
Today, in the United States, the average female inmate
is thirty-six years old, Caucasian, has dependent children, 3
and is incarcerated for a drug related offense.' Typically,
female inmates have a history of physical and/or sexual
abuse before they are incarcerated, which makes them even
more susceptible to abuse by male guards or officials.'5
In the past, female inmates have been reluctant to report
incidents of sexual assault and harassment that they suffer
in prison. However, as with the increased reports of spousal
rapes,"6 more women are coming forward to report instances
of sexual harassment and abuse from male prison guards or
officials. 7 These types of lawsuits have become much more
prevalent in the last five to ten years.' Unfortunately, de-
9. Id. at 100. These basic needs include items such as food and family con-
tact. Id.
10. Id. The inmate's fight to protect herself resulted in the accidental death
of the guard. Id. This case also received more attention since the inmate was
African American, while the deceased guard was Caucasian. Id.
11. MERLO & POLLOCK, supra note 4, at 166. A recent Texas case alleged
that women inmates were coerced to have sex with male officers and then
forced to have abortions when they became pregnant. Id. Additionally, in Ha-
waii's Prison for Women, it has been estimated that approximately half of the
guards were involved in a coercive "sex ring" involving as many as 25% of the
inmates. Id. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-3, II.A.3.b, II.C.2.
12. Dennis J. Opatrny, 3 Women Sue, Allege Sex Slavery in Prison; Warden,
Guards at East Bay Facility Among the Accused, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 29,
1996, at C1. The three women sued federal prison authorities, alleging the offi-
cials knew of the sex slavery ring, but ignored their repeated pleas for help. Id.
The lawsuit was filed August 13, 1996. Id.
13. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 2. Eighty-eight percent of fe-
male inmates have dependent children.' Id.
14. Id. Sixty-two percent of female offenders are incarcerated for a drug
related offense. Id.
15. Id.
16. Dennis J. Opatrny, supra note 12, at C1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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spite this increase, the abuse of women prisoners is still
rather common, and it is believed that many abuses remain
unreported. 9 One explanation for this stems from the in-
ability of these women to obtain positive results through the
legal process.
The main legal channel for female prisoners who file a
cause of action alleging abuse by male prison guards is under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which addresses violations of constitutional
rights under the Eighth Amendment. ° 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a
means of "vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.""'
Therefore, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the female
inmate must allege a deprivation of a civil right.22
Additionally, to hold a party legally responsible for the
deprivation of a right under the Constitution, the plaintiff
must prove that the party acted under color of law.3 It is dif-
ficult for abused inmates to meet the requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, because the person acting under color of state
law must act with "deliberate indifference" 4 to inmate health
or safety."
In addition, another obstacle confronting plaintiffs
bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the "qualified im-
munity" defense available to the defendant state actor.26
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liabil-
ity for constitutional violations, except in the "most egregious
cases."2' The courts are reluctant to characterize government
19. Id.
20. See discussion infra Parts II.A.3, II.A.3.a-b. Usually women in these
situations also file suit under the Fourteenth Amendment since oftentimes
there are extant equal protection issues. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Co-
lumbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1997); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988);
Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995); Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825 (1994); Jordan v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992). This com-
ment, however, will only deal with the Eighth Amendment issues which arise
when male guards abuse female inmates.
21. Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials:
The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE
L.J. 126 n.6 (1985) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). See
discussion infra Part II.A.
22. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
24. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.b.
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.b.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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conduct as "egregious."2 Many of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases
are dismissed or found in favor of the government on the ba-
sis of the qualified immunity defense. Accordingly, this
comment advocates a change in the interpretation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 which would enable injured female inmates a
means to obtain legal redress.
First, the background section of this comment discusses
the most common cause of action for sexual harassment
and/or sexual abuse of female inmates by male guards.29 This
section explores under what circumstances a plaintiff may
file a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, what type(s) of violation(s)
the plaintiff must allege, and who must commit the viola-
tion(s).3" This section also distinguishes between suits
against individuals and those against municipalities.3
Moreover, it defines when a defendant has acted under color
of state law in order to meet the 42 U.S.C § 1983 require-
ments. 2 The background section then discusses the alleged
violations of the Eighth Amendment and the "deliberate in-
difference" test.3 It concludes with a discussion of the im-
munity often given to prison officials and the available reme-
dies for successful plaintiffs bringing 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims. 4
Second, the analysis section demonstrates that while the
42 U.S.C. § 1983 standard appears reasonable, it is inade-
quate to address the claims of abused female inmates.33
Qualified immunity is often given to prison officials, leaving
abused female inmates with no means of recourse.38 Addi-
tionally, the analysis section demonstrates that the current
test for finding a Constitutional violation under the Eighth
Amendment is ambiguous and inappropriate. 7
28. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1997);
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir.
1995); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Jordan v. Gardner, 953 F.2d
1137 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
30. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-2.
31. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
32. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
33. See discussion infra Parts II.A.3.a-b.
34. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.C.1, II.C.2.a.(1)-(4).
35. See discussion infra Part IV.
36. See discussion infra Part V.C.
37. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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Finally, this comment proposes that, although the stan-
dards of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment seem
reasonable and necessary on their face, a close examination
reveals that these standards are inadequate and far too rigid.
They contain numerous loop holes for prison guards, and
leave too much interpretation to the courts. The interpreta-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be based upon a strict adher-
ence to its actual language. As it is interpreted now, quali-
fied immunity is granted in far too many situations. Thus,
some form of respondeat superior liability38 should attach to
the guards who are acting in their official capacity.
II. BACKGROUND
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983'9 as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.40 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not confer sub-
stantive rights; it is solely a method for "vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred,"41 merely providing a procedure
for redress.42 As a remedial statute, this federal statute is
not a basis for jurisdiction.3 It is intended to supplement
state remedies and vindicate constitutional rights viola-
tions." However, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a civil right.45 The most
38. "Respondeat superior" is a latin term meaning "let the master answer."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990). "Under this doctrine an em-
ployer is liable in certain cases for injury to person... proximately resulting
from acts of employee done within the scope of his employment in the em-
ployer's service." Id. at 1312
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress." Id.
40. Brian Richard Henry, Title VII As a Remedy for Alleged Employment
Discrimination by State and Local Government Employers: Is It Exclusive or
Only Supplementary to 42 U.S.C. § 1983?, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 519, 520
(1986).
41. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 126 n.6 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
42. Matthew P. Previn, Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C.
1983, 83 GEO. L.J. 1498 (1995).
43. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 128.
44. Previn, supra note 42, at 1498-99.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (historical and statutory n.191).
1998] 559
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common constitutional violations alleged abused female pris-
oners are violations of the Eighth Amendment."'
1. The Meaning of "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Only "persons" may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."' In
some instances, an individual is exempt from the definition
or interpretation of "person"" and, in others, the interpreta-
tion of persons may exceed mere individuals. Corporations,
school boards, athletic associations, and state universities
have all been found to be "persons" within the meaning of the
statute." Municipalities often fall under the interpretation of
"person" as well.5" Yet, there is a different test applied when
a suit is against a municipality. 1
If the action or inaction taken by a municipality extends
beyond mere negligence, then it may be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.2 A municipality can be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 if the harm suffered is a result of an official
policy, custom, or pattern."3 However, the municipality's offi-
cial policy, custom, or pattern must also be linked to a consti-
tutional violation in order for the municipality to be held li-
able. 4
In the context of abused female inmates, Scott v. Moore"5
exemplifies when municipalities may be considered "persons"
for purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 In this
case, Artelia Scott was arrested for public intoxication and
resisting arrest. 7 She was placed in a holding cell while
awaiting arraignment.8 At the time of her holding, a male
46. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
47. Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318 (D.C. Pa. 1971).
48. Previn, supra note 42, at 1508.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (historical and statutory n.191-94).
50. Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978)).
51. Id. at 231 (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.
1996)).
52. Id. (quoting Hare v. City of Cornith, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996)).
53. Id. at 233 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 230.
56. Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978)).
57. Id. at 232.
58. Id. at 231. Scott was arrested for public intoxication, assault, and re-
sisting arrest on December 31, 1988. Id. When she was taken to Killeen City
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correctional officer, Moore, was the only officer on duty. 9
During this time, he repeatedly entered Scott's cell and sexu-
ally assaulted her."0 Scott reported the incident when she
was released from custody.6 This led to Moore's resignation
and guilty plea to criminal charges.62 Subsequently, Scott
filed suit against Moore, the City, and the Chief of Police al-
leging various state and federal constitutional claims.63
In examining Scott's complaint, the court considered
when municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Al-
though municipalities are considered persons within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,65 they are only held liable when
the "harm suffered [i]s the result of an 'official policy, custom,
or pattern.' 66 Prison officials may not be held liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "mere negligence in oversight[;
nionetheless, [they] may not ignore obvious dangers to in-
mates."67 In addition, they may not be held liable under re-
spondeat superior principles."
In Scott, the court established a three-part test plaintiffs
must meet in order to hold a municipality liable.69 First, the
City must have "promulgated 'an official policy, practice, or
custom,'" leaving it subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.70
Second, a plaintiff must establish that the policy can be
linked to a constitutional violation.7 ' Third, a plaintiff must
prove that the municipality's action, or inaction, "extended
beyond mere negligent oversight of [her] constitutional
rights."72 In Scott, the court held that a jury could find that
the plaintiff met all three requirements, it then vacated the
Jail, she was processed by the female jailer who was on duty. Id. After the fe-
male jailer's shift ended, defendant George Moore's shift began. Id.
59. Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230, 231 (3d Cir. 1996).
60. Id.
61. Id. She was unable to report the incident earlier since Moore followed
her and stood next to her during her three phone calls. Id.
62. Id. at 230-31.
63. Id.
64. Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1996). Moore declared bank-
ruptcy after the suit was filed. The bankruptcy proceeding discharged Scott's
claim against him. Id. at 231.
65. Id. at 233.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. See also supra note 38 (defining "respondeat superior").
69. Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230, 233 (3d Cir. 1996).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 233.
72. Id.
1998] 561
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district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs 42
U.S.C. § 1983 inadequate staffing claim and remanded the
case for further proceedings."3
Unlike a municipality, a state cannot qualify as a
"person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 74 Along this
same line, a suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is "no different from a suit against the state."' 5
Thus, individuals, such as state prison guards, are exempt
from the definition of "person."6 Further, the Eleventh
Amendment bars bringing a suit in federal court against a
nonconsenting state." This occurs when relief is sought
against the state and not the individual state official."
2. Acting Under Color of State Law
The most common cause of action for sexual harassment
and/or sexual abuse inflicted upon female inmates by male
guards is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of con-
stitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. 9 To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a consti-
tutional violation and show the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.8" A de-
fendant acts under color of state law when he has the
authority of state law and exercises power under it.8
73. Id. at 236.
74. Previn, supra note 42, at 1508.
75. Id.
76. Id. This is so unless the prayer is for injunctive relief. Id. at 1509; but
see id. at 1509 n.3090 (comparing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (individual
capacity suit against state official in her individual capacity upheld even when
official's actions were cloaked with state authority and could not have been ef-
fectuated had she been only acting in her personal capacity); and White v.
Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 1993) (state prison officials sued in their in-
dividual capacities are not absolutely immune from personal liability), cert. de-
nied, 510 U.S. 1096 (1994)).
77. Previn, supra note 42, at 1508 n.3089 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
78. Previn, supra note 42, at 1508 n.3089 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)).
79. See supra note 20.
80. Previn, supra note 42, at 1498-99. If a plaintiff cannot allege a constitu-
tional violation, she may allege a deprivation of rights guaranteed by federal
laws. Id. at 1499.
81. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
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In West v. Atkins," the Supreme Court promulgated the
42 U.S.C. § 1983 acting under "color of state law" analysis."
The facts surrounding West are as follows. While Quincy
West was incarcerated at Odom Correction Center, in Jack-
son, North Carolina, he injured his Achilles tendon while
playing volleyball.' Over a period of several months, West
saw Dr. Samuel Atkins, who was under a contract to provide
orthopedic services to inmates.85 Dr. Atkins placed West's leg
in a series of casts and advised him that surgery was neces-
sary." Dr. Atkins, however, failed to schedule the surgery,
leaving West with a very swollen and painful ankle. 7 Moreo-
ver, West was not free to see a physician of his own choosing,
since he was "a prisoner in 'close custody.'"88 Thereafter,
when West did not receive the necessary medical treatment,
he filed a cause of action against Atkins for violation of his
civil rights.8
The main issue in West was whether Atkins acted
"'under color of state law' within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, when he treat[ed] ... inmate[s]." ° The court
proceeded with the following analysis. For a plaintiff to state
a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he or she must al-
lege "a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law."9 The traditional definition of "acting under color
of state law" provides that the defendant "exercised power
'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only be-
cause the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.'"92 The alleged deprivation "must be caused by the exer-
cise of some right or privilege created by the State... or by a
person for whom the State is responsible."" The person who
82. Id. at 42.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 43.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id.
87. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 44 (1988).
88. Id. North Carolina does not allow prisoners, except minimum security
prisoners, to obtain their own medical care at their own expense. Id. at 44 n.2.
89. Id. at 45.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 47.
92. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).
93. Id. at 47.
19981 563
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allegedly caused the deprivation must be a state actor.9 4
Generally, state employment is enough to qualify a defendant
as a state actor.95 Since Dr. Atkins had a contract to provide
medical care to inmates, the court held that Dr. Atkins'
medical treatment to West qualified as state action, and that
Dr. Atkins acted under color of state law.6
The Court in West created a two-prong test to determine
whether a private individual acted under color of state law.97
Under the first prong, the alleged deprivation must result
from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
state authority." The court gives three examples of what
qualifies under this first prong.99 The first example, articu-
lated in U.S. v. Classic,'00 states that "[m]isuse of power, pos-
sessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is
action taken 'under color of state law.""0' In the second ex-
ample, from Adickes v. H.H. Kress & Co.,"2 the Court held
that a defendant does not have to be an officer of the state to
act under state law; "it is sufficient that she 'is a willful par-
ticipant in joint activity with the State or its agents.'"' 3 In
West,"TM the third example, the Court held that private per-
sons who are authorized to exercise state authority are
deemed to be "acting under color of state law." "'
The second prong of the test, to determine whether one
acted under color of state law, provides "that if a defendant's
conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 'that conduct [is] also action under color
of state law and will support a suit under [42
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 54.
97. Previn, supra note 42, at 1498 n.3059.
98. Id. at 1498 n.3059 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982)).
99. Id.
100. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
101. Previn, supra note 42, 1498 n.3059 (citing United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
102. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
103. Previn, supra note 42, at 1498 n.3059 (citing Adickes v. H.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)).
104. 487 U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988).
105. Previn, supra note 42, at 1498 n.3059 (1995) (citing West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 54-55 (1988)).
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U.S.C.] § 1983.'" 16 If the state action requirement is met,
then the "alleged infringement of the plaintiff's federal rights
is fairly attributable to the state."1 7
3. Constitutional Rights; Violations of the Eighth
Amendment
To state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution for a deprivation of a con-
stitutional right, the alleged deprivation must be "objectively
sufficiently serious," and the prison official must have a
"sufficiently culpable state of mind." 18 The state of mind is
determined by whether the prison official had a deliberate
indifference to the inmate's health or safety.0 9 Only if a
prison official knows that an inmate "face[s] a substantial
risk of serious harm and disregards that risk [of harm] by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it," will the
prison official be held liable."0
The case of Adkins v. Rodriguez"' illustrates that even
"outrageous and unacceptable conduct" by a prison guard
may not necessarily constitute an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion."' In this case, Shelly Adkins was serving a sentence for
a felony conviction at Huerfano County Jail."' Deputy
Rodriguez was a trainee at the Sheriff's Department in Huer-
fano County."" From January 6, 1990 through March 22,
1990, Deputy Rodriguez commented to Adkins about her
body, his sexual prowess, and his sexual conquests."5 Adkins
complained to Sergeant Garcia, who advised Rodriguez that
male guards were only to use the intercom to speak with fe-
male inmates."6 Sergeant Garcia also required that conver-
sations be limited to business matters."7 This, however, did
106. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982)).
107. Id.
108. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
109. Id. at 834.
110. Id. at 825.
111. 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
112. Id. at 1037.
113. Id. at 1035.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1035.
117. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1995).
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not stop Deputy Rodriguez. "8
On March 22, 1990, Rodriguez, on the graveyard shift,
took the keys to the female inmates' cells and entered
Adkins' cell."9 Adkins awoke with Rodriguez standing over
her bed.' According to Adkins, Rodriguez told her that he
was checking up on her.'2' As he left, he said, "[b]y the way,
you have nice breasts."22 Adkins complained about the inci-
dent but, when questioned, Rodriguez claimed that he heard
Adkins "moaning in pain and entered her cell to bring her
medication for a toothache."2 ' As a result of Adkins' com-
plaint, Rodriguez was suspended for a week.' Thereafter,
he resigned during the suspension week.' Adkins then filed
a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution.
21
The district court had to determine whether Adkins "was
denied the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."'27
The court reasoned that since allegations of sexual harass-
ment in the employment context are not covered by 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Adkins did not have a "clearly established
right to be free of sexual harassment in a prison setting."
28
Therefore, the. district court dismissed Adkins' complaint,
"finding no clearly established right under the Eighth
Amendment [of the Constitution] for a prisoner to be free
[from] verbal sexual harassment."29
On appeal, Adkins had the burden of establishing that
when the harassment occurred she "had a clearly established
right to be free from verbal sexual harassment."'0 While the
appellate court acknowledged that the acts by Rodriguez
were "outrageous and unacceptable conduct by a jailer," it
118. Id. at 1036.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1035.
123. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 1036.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1035. Adkins also filed suit under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. As stated above, only the alleged
violation of the Eighth Amendment will be discussed in this comment.
127. Id.
128. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir, 1995).
129. Id. at 1036.
130. Id. Rodriguez claimed qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.
Id. This left Adkins with the burden she now bears. Id.
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found no constitutional violation.' Therefore, the court of
appeals supported the district court's ruling, affirming the
defendant's summary judgment motion based on the affirma-
tive defense of qualified immunity.
12
a. Test for Determining Eighth Amendment
Liability
The United States Supreme Court decision in Farmer v.
Brennan' illustrates conditions under which a prison official
may be held liable for the actions of a prisoner in violation of
another prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. Dee Farmer, a
male inmate, was a preoperative transsexual placed in the
general population of a male prison."' It was uncontested
that Farmer "project[ed] feminine characteristics." 5 Farmer
had undergone estrogen therapy, surgically received breast
implants, and "submitted to unsuccessful 'black market' tes-
ticle-removal surgery.""'
On at least one occasion, Farmer was required to be seg-
regated for his own safety.'37 However, Farmer was later
transferred to the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute,
Indiana, where he was placed in the general population. 8
Within two weeks, Farmer was beaten and raped by another
inmate in his own cell.'39 Farmer filed suit alleging a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment."0
The court opined, "[iut is now settled that the treatment a
prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he
is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amend-
ment."4 It also held that "[p]rison officials have a duty ... to
131. Id. at 1037.
132. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1038 (10th Cir, 1995); see discussion
infra Part II.B regarding qualified immunity.
133. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
134. Id. at 829.
135. Id. For example, Farmer continued his hormone treatment in prison
through smuggled drugs. Id. Farmer also wore his clothing in a feminine
manner. Id.
136. Id.
137. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994).
138. Id.
139. Id. Apparently, petitioner had no objection, or voiced no objection, to
being placed in general population. Id. However, Farmer was segregated sev-
eral days later while awaiting information regarding his HIV positive status.
Id. Farmer reported the incident several days after its occurrence. Id.
140. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994).
141. Id. at 832.
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protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prison-
ers."142  The officials must "take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates."'4
In Farmer, the court held that a prison official violates
the Eighth Amendment only if two requirements are met.'"
First, the "deprivation alleged must be 'objectively suffi-
ciently serious,'" meaning that the official's "act or omission
must result in the denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities.'" 145 When the claim is against an official for
the failure to prevent harm, "the inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of se-
rious harm." 6
Second, the "state of mind [must be] one of 'deliberate
indifference' to inmate health or safety." 47 The principle up-
held in this requirement is that "only the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amend-
ment.""8 The issue in this case, however, was what qualifies
as "deliberate indifference.""19
b. Deliberate Indifference
In Farmer, the Court defined deliberate indifference as a
state of mind which is "more blameworthy than negli-
gence."5 ' When there is a cause of action under the Eighth
Amendment for excessive physical force, the claimant must
do more than prove "'indifference'... [; t]he claimant must
show that officials applied force 'maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm. " "'
The test for determining deliberate indifference is
whether the "official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
142. Id. at 833 (citing Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556,
558 (1st Cir. 1988)).
143. Id. at 832 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
144. Id. at 834.
145. Id.
146. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 835.
151. Id.
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draw the inference.""2 Therefore, officials who knew of the
risk to inmate health or safety may be "free from liability if
they responded reasonably to the risk."5 '
The deliberate indifference test was also at issue in Long
v. McGinnis.' In this case, Long was an inmate at the
Huron Valley Women's Facility.'55 She was transferred to the
Men's Facility for temporary medical treatment in its infir-
mary. "'56 While she was in the infirmary, a male inmate,
Stroman, gained access to the cell's locking mechanism and
proceeded to hold a knife to Long's throat and rape her.'57
Long alleged that the guard who was on duty, Weiss, knew
that a female was in the infirmary and that Stroman had po-
tential access to those cells.'58 Long claimed that Weiss spent
his time on duty watching television rather than patrolling
the area.9
Plaintiff filed a cause of action against the Michigan De-
partment of Corrections, its director, Weiss, and Stroman for
monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16° However, the
district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment as to the claims against Weiss, finding that there
was no "genuine issue of material fact as to whether Weiss
was 'deliberately indifferent.'"'6' The court of appeals af-
firmed this decision, articulating the standard that under the
Eighth Amendment, the victim must prove that the guard
showed "deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm"
to hold the prison guard liable for the rape of one inmate by
another.62 The court concluded that Long did not show Weiss
had a deliberate indifference to the risk of harm, nor did
152. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
153. Id. at 844. The case was remanded to determine whether the prison
officials would have liability for not preventing the harm to Farmer under the
deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 851.
154. Long v. McGinnis, No. 95-1227, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (6th
Cir. Sept. 17, 1996).
155. Id. at *2.
156. Id.
157. Id. The male inmate, James Stroman, gained access to the locking
mechanism when he was cleaning the nurses' station. Id. He claims that the
"encounter was consensual." Id.
158. Long v. McGinnis, No. 95-1227, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *2 (6th
Cir. Sept. 17, 1996).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *3.
162. Id. at *5.
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Long offer evidence that Weiss had a culpable state of
mind.
163
Another case applying the Eighth Amendment and the
deliberate indifference test is Hovater v. Robinson.'"4 The
Hovater court applied this test to a situation involving a de-
tention officer personally accused of sexually assaulting a
female inmate.16 Jerrie Hovater claimed that she was sexu-
ally assaulted by Tommie Robinson, a detention officer, while
incarcerated at the Sedwick County Jail.166
On June 7, 1988, Robinson called Hovater to the jail's
third floor library to straighten the books. 67 Hovater claims
that during this time Robinson sexually propositioned her,
made a sexual advance, and said he would call her again the
next day.' The next day she was, in fact, called to the third
floor. Hovater alleged that Robinson forcibly sodomized her
in the library.'69 When Robinson again called her to the third
floor later that same day, she told the elevator operator about
Robinson's sexual advances towards her.17 The elevator op-
erator contacted a supervisor after bringing Hovater to the
third floor.'
On June 9, 1988, Robinson was placed on probation.
172
Thereafter, he resigned. 173 Hovater filed suit against Robin-
son, Sedgwick County, and Sheriff Hill, alleging violations of
her constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Hovater claimed her rights were violated
since she was not protected from the jail guards. 175 She al-
leged that the defendants were responsible because of a pol-
icy and custom of allowing the defendant "to have unsuper-
vised access to and custody of female inmates over an
extended period of time with deliberate indifference to the
163. Id. at *5-*6.
164. 1 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993).
165. Id. at 1064.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1063-64. Mr. Robinson's duties included escorting inmates from
the elevator to appropriate rooms on the third floor. Id. at 1063.
168. Id. at 1063-64.
169. Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 1993).
170. Id. at 1065.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1065 (10th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 38
RIGHTS OF FEMALE INMATES
consequences, for failure to train the detention officers to
prevent the policy and custom from occurring in the first
place, and for failure to supervise and protect."176
Defendant Sheriff Hill and Sedgwick County moved for
summary judgment. 177 Sheriff Hill asserted the defense of
qualified immunity.178 The district court denied the motion,
holding that Sheriff Hill had "constructive notice that Robin-
son, a single male officer, had unsupervised care and custody
of female inmates."17' Thus, the court found that Sheriff Hill
and Sedgwick County were aware that Hovater's alleged in-
jury was "likely to result when a single male officer had un-
supervised care and custody of a single female inmate."80
The court of appeals, however, reversed, finding that Sheriff
Hill had no knowledge that Robinson was a threat to female
inmates' and, thus, was entitled to qualified immunity.'82
B. Qualified Immunity
A common defense to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is quali-
fied immunity." It has no "textual basis in either the Con-
stitution or statute"-it is entirely court created. 8 ' There are
three competing goals which qualified immunity attempts to
serve.' The first is to "provide... effective redress to per-
sons whose constitutional rights have been violated by gov-
ernment officials."8 ' The second goal is to "deter... officials
from abusing their power in derogation of the Constitu-
tion."'87 The third goal is to "protect... officials from being
unduly burdened by the threat of potential liability in the
176. Id. at 1065. There was a policy that a female officer, if available, was to
escort female inmates to various places within the jail. If a female detention
officer was not available, then two male detention officers were to escort the
female inmate. This is one of the policies which Hovater claims was violated.
Id. at 1065.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1066.
179. Id. at 1065.
180. Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1066 (1993).
181 Id. at 1068.
182. Id.
183. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 126. Other defenses are res judicata, col-
lateral estoppel, and absolute immunity. Previn, supra note 42, at 1507.
184. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 129.
185. Id. at 126.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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discharge of their discretionary duties."18
Qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for constitutional violations except in the "most egre-
gious cases."189 Such immunity is granted when government
officials are performing discretionary functions. 9 ° They are
"generally... shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known." 9' Therefore, the first step in determining
whether qualified immunity applies is dependent upon
whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitu-
tional right.9 ' If the plaintiff has, then the next step "is to
decide if [the] right was clearly established at [the] time [the]
conduct occurred and whether [the] defendant's conduct was
objectively reasonable."' If the plaintiff is successful in es-
tablishing this, the issue becomes the "objective legal reason-
ableness of defendant's conduct under [the] circumstances. "'94
In other words, the issue is "whether [a] reasonable official
would have known that alleged acts violated that right." 95
Finally, a plaintiff may only overcome a qualified immu-
nity defense by showing that his or her rights were clearly
established under the Constitution of the United States at
the time of the violation.
96
C. Remedies
1. Conventional Remedies
If a plaintiff prevails on his or her 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim, monetary relief is granted by way of nominal, compen-
188. Id.
189. Id. at 128.
190. Previn, supra note 42, at 1511-12. Discretionary functions appear to be
judgment calls required by one's job position. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)
(historical and statutory n.3293). A correctional officer performs a discretion-
ary function when he exercises his authority to use reasonable force for a per-
missible purpose. Foster v. McGrail, 844 F. Supp. 16, 24 (D.C. Mass. 1994).
191. Previn, supra note 42, at 1506.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (historical and statutory n.3288).
193. Id. (citing Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914 (1995)).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (historical and statutory n.3288 (citing Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190 (1996))).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (citing Foulks v. Cole County, 991 F.2d 454
(1993)).
196. Previn, supra note 42, at 1516 n.3100.
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satory, and/or punitive damages. 17  However, monetary li-
ability is only imposed on "persons" responsible for the depri-
vation of the constitutional or federal rights.'98 Since a state
does not qualify as a person within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, state officials acting in their official capacity
also do not qualify under the meaning of "person. 9"'" Thus, if
the violator qualifies for official immunity, then the "prisoner
may be barred from obtaining damages under [42
U.S.C.] § 1983, despite the fact that [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 does
not on its face provide for any sort of official immunity."2°
42 U.S.C. § 1983 exempts the individual acting in his of-
ficial state capacity from the definition of "person," unless the
action involves a prayer for injunctive relief.20 ' Injunctive re-
lief may be granted if an "inmate continues to be deprived of
her rights," and there is a "real and immediate threat that
the prisoner will be the victim of an unconstitutional ac-
tion.""' Attorneys fees may also be granted to the prevailing
party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.203
2. Remedies Exceeding the Court's Authority
a. The Women Prisoners Case
In Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Depart-
ment of Corrections v. District of Columbia,2" the district
court found a number of violations of statutory and constitu-
tional provisions committed by the District of Columbia De-
partment of Corrections ("DCDC"). °0  The judgment of the
district court ordered improvement of a number of conditions
at the various DCDC facilities. 26 This judgment order was
197. Id. at 1514.
198. Id. at 1508.
199. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
200. Previn, supra note 42, at 1510.
201. Id. at 1508-09. Injunctive relief entails, "[a] court order prohibiting
someone form doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some
wrong or injury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990).
202. Previn, supra note 42, at 1506.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994); see also Previn, supra note 42, at 1506.
204. 93 F.3d 910 (1996).
205. Id. As mentioned earlier, the constitutional violation of the Eighth
Amendment is the only one to be discussed. The other alleged violations were
of D.C. Code § 24-442, Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681, and the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id.
206. Id.
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then contested on appeal. Ultimately, the court of appeals
found the district's order to be beyond the scope of the court's
authority.
20 7
(1) Background and Factual Findings of Women
Prisoners
In Women Prisoners, the district court found that there
had been numerous incidents of sexual misconduct between
the male prison employees and the female inmates in all
three of the DCDC facilities.0 8 Approximately a half dozen
female inmates testified they had been sexually assaulted by
prison guards.0 9 The misconduct included inappropriate re-
marks, invasions of privacy, and violent sexual assaults. 10
One of the "most disturbing" aspects of these violations was
"the inadequacy of the Defendant's response to these at-
tacks." 1' Defendant had adopted procedures and policies to
deal with sexual misconduct; however, there were no
training procedures, consistent reporting practices, investiga-
tions, or severe sanctions implemented."3 Therefore, the pro-
cedures and policies were of little use. '
(2) Conclusions of Law
The court held that the sexual harassment at the three
DCDC facilities at issue21 were violations of the Eighth
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punish-
ment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.216
207. Id. at 932.
208. Id. at 914. The District houses women serving sentences over one year
in three facilities: the Lorton Minimum Security Annex, the Correctional
Treatment Facility, and the Central Detention Facility. Women Prisoners of
the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910,
913 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1997).
209. Id. at 914.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
215. The three facilities at issue were the Lorton Minimum Security Annex,
the Correctional Treatment Facility, and the Central Detention Facility.
Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 913.
216. Id. at 916.
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(3) District Court's Order
To remedy the violations, the district court ordered that
the DCDC enact and comply with a number of regulations.
The Order required the DCDC to implement a regulation
which prohibited sexual harassment and invasions of female
inmates' privacy.217 The regulation was to provide that fe-
male inmates who made complaints would not be subject to
disciplinary action, irrespective of the merits of the com-
plaint.218 The Order also authorized the Special Officer of the
district court to investigate any allegations of sexual miscon-
duct and to participate in the penalties for the violation.1 '
Lastly, the Order required that the DCDC comply with
its own Inmate Grievance Procedure.22 ° The Inmate Griev-
ance Procedure is the device by which inmates are able to re-
port misconduct by prison guards.221 The court further pro-
vided that the DCDC must also employ "'trainers' to instruct
inmates and jailers about the [DCDC]'s policies and regula-
tions regarding sexual harassment, to heighten their aware-
ness of the problem.""'
(4) Defendants' Challenges
Defendants challenged the District Court's Order that
the sexual harassment the women endured was a violation of
their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment.2 3 Specifically, they challenged the authoriza-
tion allowing the Special Officer's staff to monitor sexual
harassment complaints, the requirement that the DCDC
comply with its own Inmate Grievance Procedure, and the
prohibitions against taking any retaliatory action against
inmates who file complaints. 2
(5) The D.C. Circuit Court's Ruling
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld
217. Id. at 917.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 913. The defendants challenged more than just the orders relat-
ing to the sexual harassment. Id.
224. Id. at 918.
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the Order pertaining to the Inmate Grievance Procedure and
the provision covering retaliation against inmates for re-
porting complaints.225 The court did, however, agree with the
defendants' argument that the district court judge over-
stepped the court's role by ordering a special officer to moni-
tor and oversee the implementation of the district court's Or-
der.226 Therefore, that part of the decision was overturned.227
The implementation of the Inmate Grievance Procedure and
the retaliation provision were left to the prison facility's own
personnel, despite the fact that they were found to be in vio-
lation of the women's constitutional rights. 8
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
As the background section describes, many of the sexual
harassment and/or sexual assault complaints brought by fe-
male inmates do not result in the inmates' favor. More real-
istic standards for valid causes of action and resulting liabil-
ity must be created. As the standards now exist, many
injured women have no appropriate legal redress against
their male violators. The difficulty in attaching liability to
states and municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in over-
coming the qualified immunity defense prohibits plaintiffs
from obtaining judgments in their favor. Frequently over-
looked complaints and improper procedures are not consid-
ered "official" policies and, therefore, do not result in munici-
pality liability. Finally, the "deliberate indifference"
standard, applied to alleged Eighth Amendment violations, is
an extremely rigid one, foreclosing a large portion of female
inmates from successfully bringing their claims of alleged
abuses.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The "Official" Policy Standard for Municipality Liability
Is Inadequate
The standard for holding municipalities liable, as dis-
cussed above, requires that the "harm suffered was the result
225. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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of an 'official policy, custom, or pattern.' 229 The action, or in-
action, by the municipality must extend beyond mere negli-
gence."O This standard does not, therefore, encompass unof-
ficial, but frequently followed, customs or patterns, such as
allowing male guards to be alone with female inmates.
Moreover, this standard does not encompass situations where
complaints are merely overlooked, and not investigated.23'
Under the current standard, allegations of sexual mis-
conduct which are reported but not investigated would not be
actionable, unless there was an "official" policy not to investi-
gate.212 Therefore, even if some further sexual abuse occurred
similar to that previously complained of, there would still be
no municipal liability. Only when there is a long and docu-
mented history of uninvestigated allegations will the failure
to investigate qualify as an official custom or pattern. While
it is easy to find that a municipality's employees acted with
authority, it is difficult to prove whether their action or inac-
tion is official.
B. The Eighth Amendment
A strict standard must be met to find a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The standard for finding such a viola-
tion provides that the harm suffered must be "objectively suf-
ficiently serious" and the prison official must have a culpable
state of mind.2 3 To be "objectively sufficiently serious," there
must be a "denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities."" For the prison official to be found to have a
culpable state of mind, the official must also show a deliber-
ate indifference to inmate health and/or safety.3 5
1. The Denial of the "Minimal Civilized Measure of
Life's Necessities"
The first aspect of this test, "objectively sufficiently seri-
ous," has been defined by courts to mean that the action of
the official resulted in the denial of "the minimal civilized
229. Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1996).
230. Id.
231. Carol Ness, Suit Accuses Jailer of Assault; 6 Women on Road Crew Say
He Made Threats, Forced Sex, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 1995, at A2.
232. See supra Part II.A.1.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
234. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995).
235. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1994).
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measure of life's necessities."36 A very conservative interpre-
tation would be that only what is necessary to survive meets
this test. For example, food, water, clothing, shelter, and ba-
sic medical care would qualify. Under this interpretation,
even acts of rape might not qualify as being a denial of "the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.""7 An argu-
ment could be made that the United States is a civilized soci-
ety, yet rape is quite prevalent; therefore, the absence of rape
is not a requirement of the "minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities."38 Women are able to survive rape, hence
the term "Rape Survivor." Yet, it is certainly arguable that
being subjected to rape is a denial of a civilized aspect of one
of life's necessities or basic right to be free from unwanted
bodily intrusion.
However, since being subjected to rape may not be a dep-
rivation of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessi-
ties," it is even less probable that sexual assault, improper
touching, or verbal forcible oral copulation would meet the
above standard. The word "civilized" brings with it much de-
bate. It is subject to different interpretations by different
courts. While some liberal judges may be of the opinion that
rape, sexual assault, and improper touching are deprivations
of the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities, other,
more conservative, judges may not. For instance, in Adkins,
the court found that verbal sexual harassment, "threats of
violence and sexual assault and/or sexual intimidation" did
not constitute a denial of the "minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities." 9 The emphasis on "civilized measures of
life's necessities" does not carry with it any concrete interpre-
tations. To some, this may mean food and water, while to
others clothing and shelter. Yet, to even others, it may mean
being free from sexual intimidation, assault and harassment
of any kind.
This standard of the minimum measure of life's necessi-
ties is much too rigorous to realistically address the viola-
tions female inmates face by male guards. Frequently, male
236. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995).
237. Id. at 1036.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1036-38. However, a court hearing a Title VII suit would be more
inclined to find that verbal sexual harassment was not "civilized." Priest v. Ro-
tary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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guards verbally and physically abuse female inmates.24° By
applying this interpretation, these improper practices are
allowed to continue unabated.
Therefore, when an alleged harm is sexual harassment
with no physical touching involved, it will most likely not be
seen as a denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's ne-
cessities."24' As Adkins v. Rodriguez demonstrates, without
physical contact, there is not a deprivation of the minimal
measure of life's necessities.24
2. Deliberate Indifference of Inmate Health or Safety Is
Too Rigorous a Standard to Meet
The second part of the two-part test requires that the of-
ficial must have a culpable state of mind, meaning the official
must show "'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or
safety."24 This has been interpreted to mean that the official
must know of and disregard an excessive risk of harm to in-
mate health or safety.2 Once again, it is often too difficult
for plaintiffs to meet this standard.
For instance, in Hovater, the district court found that the
sheriff and county were aware that harm could result when a
male officer was with a female prisoner alone, yet the court of
appeals held that the sheriff had no knowledge that Robinson
was a threat to the female inmates.24 Therefore, the sheriff
was given qualified immunity.24 The district court found the
sheriff was aware of a disregard for the safety of the in-
mates. 47 Nevertheless, the court concluded that this knowl-
edge must not have been specific enough or excessive enough
for the court to find that the sheriff had a "deliberate indif-
ference."24
Yet knowing the danger inherent in leaving a female
prisoner alone with a male guard, and doing nothing to pre-
vent that harm, certainly suggests that a prison facility
"know[s] of and disregards the threat to inmate health or
240. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036-38 (10th Cir. 1995).
241. Id. at 1036-38.
242. Id.
243. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 831 (1994).
244. Id. at 831.
245. Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993).
246. Id. at 1068.
247. Id. at 1067.
248. Id.
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safety." Hovater appears to meet this interpretation. Since
these suits fall under the Eighth Amendment, thereby impli-
cating constitutional issues, the courts appear to require a
showing of heightened severity of physical abuse before they
will find a violation under the Eighth Amendment.
When abused female inmates cannot meet the standards
for a prima facie case, there is no recourse against the viola-
tors under the Eighth Amendment.249 Unless there is a dif-
ferent interpretation, female inmates will continue to fail to
state a cause of action for a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment.25° Consequently, the practice will continue unabated
and more and more female inmates will continue to be
harmed. 5'
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Qualified Immunity
42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly provides that a person must be
acting under color of state law to be held liable.252 What can-
not be found anywhere in the actual text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is an exemption creating qualified immunity.253  This is be-
cause qualified immunity is not in the statute nor in the Con-
stitution,254 rather, it is completely court created.255 Yet, there
are many cases which grant qualified immunity to either the
actual wrongdoer, the employer, or personnel manager.256
The second problem created by the qualified immunity
standard is that it provides that one cannot obtain qualified
immunity if the actions violate a "clearly established consti-
tutional or statutory right."257 On its face, this appears rea-
sonable. However, when dealing with sexual harassment of
249. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995); Long v. McGinnis,
No. 95-1227, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 25356, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 1996); West
v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
250. See discussion infra Part V.
251. This is exemplified through the continual newspaper articles and books
on the subject. See, e.g., MERLO & POLLOCK, supra note 4, at 166; BELKNAP,
supra note 5, at 100; Ness, supra note 231, at A2.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or Territory of the District
of Columbia... causes.., the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law .... " Id.
253. Id.
254. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 126.
255. Id.
256. See discussion infra Parts II.A.3, II.A.3.b.
257. Previn, supra note 42, at 1512.
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female inmates, a problem still exists. While sexual harass-
ment has occurred for numerous years, it has just recently
begun to be reported. '58 There are few precedents upon which
the courts can rely; therefore, denying qualified immunity
only for violations of "a clearly established statutory or con-
stitutional right" results in a Catch-22 situation. The lack of
precedent means that the rights of female inmates are not
clearly established. So long as this right is not clearly estab-
lished, female inmates cannot successfully defeat a qualified
immunity defense.
This is the case in many sexual harassment situations. 59
The current standard provides that if there has been no ac-
tual physical touching or assault, then there has been no
right violated against the female inmate. 6 ' Yet, in the em-
ployment setting such conduct is clearly a violation of a right
and, therefore, has legal ramifications.26'
Title VII protects employees from verbal and physical
sexual harassment in the work place. 62 This stems from the
rationale that working is one's livelihood and, accordingly,
the workplace must be free from harassment and intimida-
tion.26 While in a work setting, the victim may resign and
acquire a new job, the victim in a prison setting has no op-
tions of leaving, moving to a new prison, or transferring. Yet,
there is no violation of an inmate's rights if there has been no
physical touching or assault.2 ' This is because the violation
is not seen as a deprivation of the "minimal civilized measure
of life's necessity."265
Adkins recognized that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a valid
cause of action for sexual harassment in the workplace and,
as a result, cannot provide prisoners with the right to be free
from such harassment and intimidation in the prison set-
ting.66 What the court did not recognize, however, is that
258. Dennis J. Opatrny, 3 Women Sue, Allege Sex Slavery in Prison; Warden,
Guards at East Bay Facility Among the Accused, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 29,
1996, at C1.
259. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
260. Id.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 703 (1964). In the employment context, Title VII protects
employees from sexual harassment, both physical and verbal. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1036.
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people in the workplace have other options, remedies, or re-
course available to them. They are able to file suit under Ti-
tle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2"7 Or, if they wish, they
can transfer to a different office, or terminate their employ-
ment. Obviously, none of these options are available to fe-
male inmates who cannot flee from prison officials.
Inmates "do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison."268 The
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
hibits cruel and unusual punishment.269 However, the court
in Adkins did not find constant verbal harassment of a fe-
male inmate to be cruel and unusual punishment.27 It ap-
pears that the court did not take into consideration the pris-
oner's actual situation, where her protection and fate is
entirely in the hands of the guards. The mere appearance of
authority of the guards can create an enormous amount of in-
timidation and fear in an inmate. Inmates realize that issues
such as visitation rights, parole, and other privileges may de-
pend on their record of good behavior. In turn, their record of
good behavior can certainly be influenced by their guards.
Thus, when guards abuse their authority, female inmates of-
ten fear there is nothing they can do without facing repercus-
sions.27'
In Adkins, Defendant Rodriguez was attempting to show
Adkins his authority and power when he obtained the key to
her cell in the middle of the night and entered it. 72 Although
he did not physically assault or rape her, he did frighten and
intimidate her.27 Thus, it should be considered cruel and
unusual punishment for a female inmate to have to antici-
pate when the guard will again enter her cell and not know
what the guard will do the next time-whether it be rape her,
assault her, or do nothing. This should be considered a viola-
tion of Adkins' right to preserve her bodily integrity and to be
free from bodily harm to which she is entitled. Not all rights
267. 42 U.S.C. § 703 (1964).
268. Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712-13 (10th Cir. 1982).
269. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
270. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1995).
271. BELKNAP, supra note 5, at 100; MERLO & POLLOCK, supra note 4, at
166.
272. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995).
273. Id.
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are lost once a woman is incarcerated.274
In Adkins, the finding of Rodriguez' qualified immunity
sent a strong message to all female inmates: unless you are
raped or physically assaulted, it is legally acceptable for a
guard to verbally sexually harass and intimidate you as he
sees fit.27 Guards will often use threats of taking away
privileges or credit towards work time or even threaten soli-
tary confinement if women report the abuses.2 76 Exempting a
guard or prison official from qualified immunity only when a
clearly established constitutional or statutory right has been
violated allows prison officials excessive leeway, without pro-
viding the prisoners appropriate protection.
D. Remedies
1. Traditional Remedies
At first glance, it appears that female inmates who have
been sexually assaulted have appropriate remedies available
to them. However, this is not the case. The remedies avail-
able to female inmates for violations of the Eighth Amend-
ment are inadequate. Monetary liability is only imposed on
"persons."277 It would seem logical that if a state official is
acting in his official capacity and committing various viola-
tions he would be held liable. However, as discussed earlier,
states and state officials acting in their official capacity are
exempt from the definition of "persons."278
While the word "person" includes an individual or a hu-
man being, but not various entities, such as states, it does,
however, include a municipality.279 Therefore, it would logi-
cally follow that a state would also be included in the defini-
tion. However, it is not. States do not face monetary liabil-
ity.28
0
As discussed above, qualified immunity is a bar to civil
damages for those that qualify. Government officials per-
274. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 126.
275. Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995).
276. Ness, supra note 231, at A2.
277. Previn, supra note 42, at 1506.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1516. For a municipality to be found liable, the policy or custom
must have been adopted or implemented by the governing body's officials. Id.
at 1516 n.3091.
280. Id. at 1516.
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forming discretionary functions generally enjoy qualified im-
munity.28' This immunity applies to official and particularly
executive functions, which include the commonly performed
functions of police officers or prison personnel.28 Therefore,
the actual person who has violated the rights of the female
inmate may enjoy qualified immunity and be barred from any
civil damages.
2. Women Prisoners: Overstepping the Judicial Scope
Women Prisoners is one of the more extreme cases in
which many constitutional violations were found against the
individual guards and the DCDC facilities in general.283 The
district court ordered implementation of various new policies
and procedures.2" The court of appeals, however, reversed
some of the Orders, holding that the district court judge had
overstepped her bounds."5 The decision of the court of ap-
peals left everything to be done internally within the
DCDC.288 The district court required the monitoring of the
DCDC's actions to ensure that the DCDC was complying;
however, it was determined that this was not within the
judge's discretion to order.287
The district judge's Order was a step in the right direc-
tion. There were numerous violations found against the
DCDC, and the judge ordered appropriate measures to en-
sure that such violations would not happen again.288 Yet
these actions were found to be outside the scope of her judi-
cial authority.289 Therefore, the court of appeals left it up to
the DCDC to solve the problems internally.29 Common sense
tells one that asking the problem-maker to solve the prob-
lems will probably not result in the most positive and produc-
tive solutions.
281. Previn, supra note 42, at 1510.
282. Id. at 1512.
283. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
284. Id. at 932.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940
(1997).
290. Id.
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Injunctive relief is often what the female inmates de-
sire.29' It would assist in alleviating the risk of harm they
face while incarcerated. However, the current injunctive re-
lief standard is too difficult for many female inmates to meet
because, to obtain the requisite injunctive relief, one must
still meet the standards for an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion.
292
V. PROPOSAL
The following proposal refers to each section discussed in
this comment: the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 standard for individuals
and municipalities, the Eighth Amendment standard, and
the available remedies. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, there is no
mention of qualified immunity, yet it is implemented in nu-
merous cases such as the ones previously discussed.
The current standard for imposing municipality liability
is excessive and difficult to meet. There are two ways to
remedy this dilemma. One option would be to exclude the
word "official" from the interpretation of municipality liabil-
ity. However, even if this were done, some manipulation still
might occur in deciding what is actually the proper policy,
custom, or pattern.
The other, and much more realistic, option would be to
allow respondeat superior liability.293 By imposing liability
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there would be a
much greater incentive on the part of the correctional facili-
ties to properly train, supervise, and evaluate their guards
and other personnel. Opponents of imposing respondeat su-
perior liability against municipalities argue that taxpayers'
money would be used to build, maintain, and defend against
lawsuits. 9' Additionally, they argue that it would be the tax-
payers' money which ultimately would pay for any adverse
judgments against the facilities. 95 However, this argument
provides all the more incentive for the correctional facilities
to properly run and maintain its organization and monitor
the actions of its personnel. If taxpayers are responsible for
291. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994).
292. Farmer requested injunctive relief. Id. at 845-46. However, his request
was denied as he was unable to meet the deliberate indifference test. Id.
293. Id.; see supra note 68.
294. Balcerzak, supra note 21, at 126.
295. Id.
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the misconduct and mismanagement of correctional facilities,
there will be enormous public, as well as political, pressure to
run and maintain these facilities properly.
The standard should still remain "more than mere negli-
gence in oversight," but it should be less than in compliance
with an "official policy, custom, or practice." As discussed
above, without respondeat superior liability, municipalities
are often not held responsible for their own employees' ac-
tions.
The standard for finding an Eighth Amendment violation
should be interpreted at a much lower level. A necessary
finding of "the minimum civilized measure of life's necessity"
is far too rigid and stringent a requirement for adequate pro-
tection of female inmates. A more appropriate interpretation
would be to require knowledge of the existing harm and fail-
ure to take measures to alleviate the risk of harm. This re-
quirement would enable a plaintiff to plead a prima facie
case.
The requirement that qualified immunity is not granted
when there is a "clearly established" violation of rights
should be interpreted differently. A proper interpretation
would provide protection when there has been a violation of
the "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws" as the words of the statute state. The
"clearly established" standard grants immunity in far too
many situations where there has been a violation of a right,
yet not a clearly established right, such as in the case of sex-
ual harassment and sexual intimidation.
Lastly, in terms of the remedies imposed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the definition of "person" should be extended
or broadened to include state officials and/or the state. Since
"person" already encompasses municipalities, the statute has
not been interpreted literally. Therefore, to expand its
meaning to include states would not alter any existing rigid
interpretation and would allow the female inmates to feel
some sense of justice being served.
VI. CONCLUSION
The numerous newspaper articles and lawsuits confirm
that mistreatment of female inmates is not just an isolated
problem within one prison system. The abuses by guards and
other prison officials is a nationwide problem throughout
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numerous correctional facilities-local, statewide and federal.
When an abused female inmate who is a victim of blatant
sexual abuse cannot establish a prima facie under the re-
quired standards of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than on the
merits of her case, it will prevent other similarly situated fe-
male inmates from speaking out. This sends a message that
it is acceptable for male guards to abuse their power by
making sexual advances, suggestions, propositions, and/or at-
tacks upon female inmates.
As this comment has demonstrated, abused female in-
mates do not have adequate means for redress under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Without redefining the standards currently
used to establish a prima facie case under this statute, it will
be difficult, if not impossible, to protect victims of sexual as-
sault from the power of authority figures and provide them
with appropriate redress and remedies. These women are
paying for their crime by their incarceration. However, their
punishment should not entail a sentence of verbal and physi-
cal sexual harassment, intimidation, and coercion-clear
violations of their constitutional rights.
Ashley E. Day
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